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ABSTRACT

SECULARIZATION AS A DECLINE IN RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
OVER GENDER

Catherine Meyers
Department of Sociology
Master of Science

Recent secularization debates have helped to interpret the changing influence of
religion over time and over social life. I argue that Chaves’ (1994) conception of
secularization, that secularization occurs as a decline in religious authority, is an effective
theoretical tool for describing religious change over time. Using GSS data and the
example of gender ideology, I attempt to illustrate this concept and argue that this view of
secularization, combined with a multidimensional approach to gender, is necessary to
more fully explain the changing relationship among religion and gender over time.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks to my family and friends for their tremendous support. I am so
grateful for the opportunity to pursue my education to this point, and I would not have
had this opportunity without the encouragement of my parents and the help of Molly, my
boon. Thanks also to Sonny for letting me mooch off his Provo dominance, to my
fantastic committee for their generous assistance, and to the amazingly transformative
powers of vitamin Z. I could not have hoped for a more insightful experience throughout
this process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Neosecularization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

Secularization at the Institutional Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

Secularization at the Organizational Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Secularization at the Individual Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Data and Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Control Variables

Table 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Items and Count Variables for Familial-Based and Equal-Opportunity-Based Gender
Ideology
Table 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Model Descriptions and Fit Statistics

Table 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Logistic Regression Odds Ratios for Gender Ideology, Institutional Level

Table 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Logistic Regression Odds Ratios for Gender Ideology, Organizational Level

Table 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Logistic Regression Odds Ratios for Gender Ideology, Individual Level

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Histograms of Dependent Variables

Figure 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Percent of Respondents in Count Categories for Familial-Based Gender Ideology

40

Figure 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Percent of Respondents in Count Categories for Equal-Opportunity-Based Gender
Ideology

41

Figure 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mean Predicted Probabilities for Familial-Based Gender Ideology Counts

42

Figure 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Mean Predicted Probabilities for Equal-Opportunity-Based Gender Ideology Counts

viii

Introduction
Religion has long been known to have a regulatory function, but its regulatory
ability has varied across time and space. Traditional sociologists of religion, such as
Durkheim and Weber, promulgated a secularization theory which predicted a change over
time, or “transformation of religion in the modern world” (Yamane 1997, p. 110). Across
space, religion’s influence varies among dimensions of social life (Bolzendahl and
Brooks 2005).
Not all aspects of religion are equally regulatory; some religious denominations
exercise more control than others. For example, strict churches require more monetary
contributions from their members, have higher levels of participation (often due to
proscriptions against other activities), and in general are more stringent in their beliefs
than their more liberal counterparts (Iannaccone 1994). Additionally, religion may be
more regulatory toward some areas of social life. Religion has been especially regulatory
toward family issues (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2005), including appropriate gender roles.
Recent secularization debates can help to interpret the changing influence of
religion over time and over social life. In this paper I argue that Chaves’ (1994)
conception of secularization, that secularization occurs as a decline in religious authority,
is an effective theoretical tool for describing religious change over time. I use the
example of gender to illustrate this concept and argue that this view of secularization,
combined with a multidimensional approach to gender, is necessary to more fully explain
the changing relationship between religion and gender over time.

1

Neosecularization
Amidst discussions about the future of secularization, Chaves (1994) suggested
that secularization be defined as a decline in religious authority. Although the muchdebated decline in religious participation was not supported by empirical evidence (see
Tschannen 1991), religion’s influence in modern society was still changing. This view of
secularization departs starkly from classical theories of secularization, which predicted a
general decline in religion (see Yamane 1997). Instead of a decline in religion, evident
through decreased religious attendance or reliance on science and other secular
explanations for questions previously answered by religion, neosecularization theory
predicts a decline in religious authority.
Neosecularization also differs from the rational choice or religious economy
theories in which there is a diversification of the religious market as new denominations
replace more secular denominations. In the religious market, “religion” subsists in a state
of equilibrium when changes in religious groups occur to meet an ever-present demand.
Chaves notes that such a view may be valid, but is not applicable to secularization
(Chaves 1994, p. 759).
Religion’s influence is not only present at a denominational, or organizational
level; religious authority has the capacity to enact influence at an institutional,
organizational, and individual level., and a decrease in religion’s influence over these
areas may be considered evidence of secularization (Chaves 1994). Religion would have
less authority over other institutions at the societal level, less denomination-based
authority at the organizational level, and less authority (when compared to that of other

2

influences) over individual choice at the individual level (Chaves 1994). By endorsing
this view of secularization, Chaves is not discounting a religious economies perspective;
nor is he predicting an actual decline in religious authority. Chaves is merely asserting
that neosecularization, or secularization as a decline in religious authority, is a more
useful operationalization than previous definitions of secularization (Chaves 1994).
To describe secularization at the institutional level, Chaves (1994) borrows the
term “laicization” from Dobbelaere (1981). Through laicization, or a process by which
secular influence replaces laicity, other institutions “gain autonomy from the religious
institutions of a society” (Chaves 1994, p. 757). Institutions possess their own rules,
scripts, and ideologies, enforcing “the rightness and necessity of their arrangements,
practices, and social relations” (Martin 2004, p. 1257). Just as the political system may
use democracy, freedom, and equality as moral aims to justify its existence, religion uses
supernatural claims (see Yamane 1997) to justify its rules, structure, norms, and beliefs
(Chaves 1994). Laicization, or secularization at the institutional level, occurs when
religious rules, practices, and beliefs decrease in authority over other institutions. For
example, elimination of creationism from school curriculum demonstrates a loss of
religious authority over the educational institution.
Secularization at the organizational level, or “internal secularization” (Chaves
1994, p. 757), occurs as religious denominations become more secular; for example, the
decision of the United Church of Christ to allow homosexual marriage can be viewed as
an instance of a religious organization converging “with the secular world” (Chaves
1994, p. 757). At the individual level, religious beliefs and practices lose their
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importance in an individual’s life as individual choices are informed less by religion and
more by other institutional arrangements. In addition to religion, individuals participate
in families, systems of education, and the labor force, each of which influence individual
behavior. For example, educational attainment is often more influential than religious
participation toward social attitudes (see, for example, Bolzendahl and Brooks 2005).
The elegance of this theory is particularly evident when used to analyze change
over time. Instead of focusing on declines in religious behaviors and beliefs,
secularization as a decline in religious authority can be used in conjunction with a variety
of situations. For example, attitudes of mainline Protestant and Catholic affiliates toward
premarital sex have become more liberal over time, while attitudes of conservative
Protestants have remained constant (Petersen and Donnenwerth 1997). Here religion has
a differential influence (or a decline in authority) at the organizational level over
members of certain denominations. Such an analysis illuminates the “varying scope of
religious authority across time and space” (Chaves 1994 pp. 764-765).
Secularization at the Institutional Level
Society is “an interinstitutional system” (Friedland and Alford 1991, p. 232),
consisting of various institutions which are both contradictory and interdependent. For
example, the religious institution may dictate a breadwinner/homemaker division of labor
for families, but may also rely on monetary contributions made possible by a dual-earner
family model. These institutions contain observable behaviors and nonobservable
symbols, or “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions” (Friedland and
Alford 1991, p. 248); for example, religious practices include prayer and religious service
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attendance, and religious symbolic constructions include beliefs about biblical literalism
and the significance of the crucifix. Thus, an institution is a social entity that is durable,
transmittable, maintainable, and reproducible (Scott 2001). Institutions are comprised of
“taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 15)
that inform meaning or ideology and constrain choices.
Religion and Gender Ideology
Gender ideology, or attitudes about appropriate behaviors for men and women, is
a belief system (Kroska 2000) upon which religion’s influence can be examined. Just as
society is composed of competing and cooperating institutions, individual ideology
incorporates various interests requiring orchestration. An individual’s gender ideology
may be informed by childhood socialization (see Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004),
workforce participation (Gerson 1987; Glass 1992; Smith 1985; Thornton, Alwin and
Camburn 1983), marital status (Finlay, Starnes, and Alvarez 1985; Plutzer 1988),
educational attainment (Harris 1980; Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn 1983), and religious
participation (Hoffmann and Miller 1997).
Gender ideology has been the focus of several studies, especially through the
1970s and 1980s (see, for example, Cherlin and Walters 1981; Dugger 1988; Ferree
1974; Finlay, Starnes, and Avarez 1985; Helmreich, Spence, and Gibson 1982; Hess and
Ferree 1987; Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Komarovsky and Mayer 1984; Lopata and Thorne
1978; Mason and Bumpass 1975; Mason, Czajka and Arber 1976; Mason and Lu 1988;
Simon and Landis 1989; Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn, 1983; Thornton and Freedman
1979). Most of these studies find an egalitarian trend over time, with respondents
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becoming more receptive toward expanding roles for men and women with reference to
the home and workplace. Brooks and Bolzendahl (2004) summarize three main
mechanisms through which change occurs: cohort replacement (gender attitudes change
as birth cohorts replace each other), ideological learning (gender attitudes change along
with other rights-based attitudes), and structural change (gender attitudes change as
familial and labor force participation change). What is often missing from gender
ideology discussions, though, is the changing influence of religion.
Though some researchers bemoan the dearth of research examining religion and
gender (see, for example, Wallace 1997), there have been several studies which find that
religion may have more authority over gender ideology than over other belief systems.
Explaining that many religious groups have a “pro-family subculture” (Gay, Ellison and
Powers 1996, p. 13), Gay et al. suggest that beliefs about biblical inerrancy and the
importance of the traditional family are firmly enforced by conservative Protestant
leaders, in turn enforcing attitudes about gender. Additionally, religious leaders may
encourage “a traditional husband-wife role structure, which they believe is more
beneficial for (adults and) children” (Morgan and Scanzoni 1987, p. 376).
Religious teachings, conservative or otherwise, may be unlikely to postulate that
men should be paid more than women or that men should refuse to work under women,
neglecting to exercise direct authority over economic ideas. But religious leaders often
do emphasize the importance of a woman’s role in the home and as a mother (Ellison and
Bartkowski 2002; Kosmin and Lachman 1993), and beliefs in biblical literalism may
amount to justification for a patriarchal relationship between men and women
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(Ammerman 1987; Bendroth 1993; Ellison and Bartkowski 2002; Wilcox 1998; see also
Moore and Vanneman 2003). Thus, religion exercises direct authority over gender
ideology.
Distinct Dimensions of Gender Ideology
Often gender ideology, or attitudes about gender, are measured as a single
dimension. But questions asking whether a preschool child suffers when a mother works
or whether men and women should be paid the same amount of money for the same work
address at least two distinct areas – gender in the home and gender in the workplace.
When researchers combine questions addressing different aspects of gender into one
scale (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004) or use only one item to depict gender attitudes
(Hoffmann and Miller 1997), nuances in gender attitude variation are hidden as we fail to
identify the different spheres in which gender is at work.
After finding a lack of unidimensionality in gender attitudes, Mason and Bumpass
(1975) refer to attitudes about gender in the home a “core ideology” (p. 1218), and to
attitudes about gender in the workplace a “secondary ideology” (p. 1218). In 1970
women held more traditional attitudes about gender in the home and more progressive
attitudes (favoring equality) about gender in the workplace (Mason and Bumpass 1975).
Here I explore the authority of religion on two dimensions of gender; I label attitudes
about gender in the home “familial-based gender ideology” and attitudes about gender in
the workplace “equal-opportunity-based gender ideology.”
When gender ideology is conceptualized as having two dimensions, religion may
have more authority over one dimension than the other. As mentioned, religion may
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exercise more authority over gender ideology than over ideas about the workplace. Thus,
rules and scripts of the religious institution may have more authority over attitudes about
gender in the home, or familial-based gender ideology, than they do over attitudes about
gender in the workplace or public sphere, or equal-opportunity-based gender ideology.
I hypothesize that, at the institutional level, (1a) the influence of religious
attendance and religious affiliation on gender ideology will change over time in an
egalitarian direction; religious attenders and affiliates will become more similar to
nonattenders and nonaffiliates. Furthermore, (1b) the changing influence of religious
attendance and affiliation on gender ideology will occur differentially across the different
dimensions of gender ideology; religious attendance and affiliation will be more
influential on familial-based gender ideology than on equal-opportunity-based gender
ideology over time.
Secularization at the Organizational Level
Conservative Protestant groups have consistently displayed more traditional
attitudes about gender than other groups (Brinkerhoff and MacKie 1984; Gay, Ellison
and Powers 1996; Hertel and Hughes 1987; Hoffmann and Miller 1997; Kosmin and
Lachman 1993; Martin et al. 1980; Moore and Vanneman 2003; Thornton, Alwin and
Camburn 1983; Thornton and Freedman 1979; Wilcox 1986); indeed, most who study
attitudinal change over time can see distinctions between groups such as conservative and
moderate Protestants. However, though conservative Protestants are more traditional in
their views than other religious groups, all groups become more liberal over time
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(Hoffmann and Miller 1997). This suggests a diminishing authority of religion at the
organizational level.
But religious organizations are not impassive actors in the secularization process.
From a religious economies perspective, when faced with perceived threats either from
competing religious groups or from other influences (Hoffmann and Miller 1997) such as
the economy, religious groups can strengthen their moral or symbolic boundaries
(Hoffmann and Miller 1997 p. 54) in an effort to maintain or reiterate their social and
religious position (Dekker 1995). If liberal religious groups take steps to reinforce their
position as liberal in relation to other religious groups, and if conservative religious
groups reinforce their position as conservative relative to other groups, a divergence in
attitudes would be seen over time (Hoffmann and Miller 1997). This pattern is evident in
existing literature; for example, conservative Protestants have retained their support for
traditional beliefs about premarital sex over time, even as the support of other religious
groups has declined (Petersen and Donnenwerth 1997). Petersen and Donnenwerth
(1998) explain that, although other forces (or influences from other institutions) may
affect attitudes in the general population, consistent religious participation and
commitment can act to immunize the religiously active against a secularizing influence.
Conservative and Evangelical Religious Groups
What is it about those who claim affiliation with conservative Protestant groups
that affects such a divergence in their attitudes from affiliates of other groups? Their
unique context, characterized by frequent attendance at church services and a literal
interpretation of the Bible, is one viable explanation. Frequent attendance increases
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interaction with like-minded peers (Moore and Vanneman 2003), providing opportunities
to reinforce conservative ideas that may be at odds with societal norms. Without this
frequent attendance, those who affiliate with conservative or evangelical denominations
may be more similar in their attitudes to those of other denominational groups (Jelen
1990).
Based on the conclusions of prior research that conservative Protestants attend
church more frequently than other groups (Roof and McKinney 1987, Sherkat and
Wilson 1995), and that participation affects moral beliefs, Sherkat and Ellison (1997)
theorize that the effects of beliefs in biblical literalism are combined with and reinforced
by teachings from religious leaders and clergy. These three factors (membership in
conservative Protestant groups, frequent church attendance, and beliefs in biblical
literalism) can cooperate to affect unique attitudes among conservative Protestants.
Evangelical and conservative Protestant attitudes may be especially unique when
considering familial-based gender logics; for example, an overview of conservative
Protestant parenting manuals yields distinct attitudes about childrearing and parental roles
(Bartkowski and Ellison 1995). However, ideology is not always predictive of behavior
(Bartkowski 1999; Gallagher and Smith 1999; Smith 2000; see Ellison and Bartkowski
2002). Conservative and evangelical Protestant leaders may proscribe traditional roles
for men and women, but actual behavior is determined by a negotiation among religious
and secular ideas (Bartkowski 2001).
I hypothesize that, at the organizational level, (2a) after accounting for different
religious groups the influence of religious group affiliation on gender ideology will
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change over time in an egalitarian direction. (2b) Affiliates of mainline Protestant groups
will, over time, become more egalitarian in their attitudes than affiliates of conservative
Protestant groups. (2c) This changing influence of religious group affiliation will occur
differentially across the different dimensions of gender ideology; religious group
affiliation will be more influential on familial-based gender ideology than on equalopportunity-based gender ideology over time.
Secularization at the Individual Level
Secularization at the individual level occurs as a decline in religious authority
over individual behaviors (Chaves 1994), but this decline is relative to the authority of
other institutions. Chaves explains that “individuals…live their lives within a number of
overlapping spheres, with some of their actions regulated by the authority of bosses at
work, some by the demands of legal systems, some by family obligations, [and] some by
the rules of religions” (Chaves 1994 p. 768). As religious authority at the individual level
is declining, participation in other institutions may exercise more authority over
individual behaviors or gender ideology. For example, religion is exercising authority
over a woman who follows conservative Protestant proscriptions to forego employment
outside of the home. But religious authority may not be as salient as the influence of
participation in other institutions.
Participation in institutions other than religion also contribute to gender ideology.
As mentioned, existing literature establishes relationships between gender ideology and
educational attainment, workforce participation, and marital status. In an
interinstitutional system, identity negotiation is practiced among those faced with
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competing interests in an effort to promote reconciliation (Ecklund 2003). For example,
in his study of evangelical families, Bartkowski (2001) described one woman’s struggle
to reconcile educational attainment, occupational goals, and desires to adhere to
conservative religious proscriptions concerning the role of women in the home. “Carole
herself was an educated, intelligent, modern woman. Carole’s commitments in principle
to full-time mothering and wifely responsiveness conflicted with her desire to remain
employed at a job she found very satisfying” (p. 158). The outcome of such negotiation
efforts becomes, at least in part, a function of the degree to which religion exercises
authority over the individual.
Religious authority at the individual level may not be as salient as participation in
other institutions, and this effect might occur differentially across the different
dimensions of gender ideology. For example, rules and scripts of the economic
institution may exercise more authority over equal-opportunity-based gender ideology
than it does over familial-based gender ideology. Educational attainment might have a
similar effect, but familial participation (i.e. being married or having children) may
exercise more authority over familial-based gender ideology.
I hypothesize that (3a) educational attainment, full-time employment, being
married, and having children will, over time, influence gender ideology more than
religious service attendance and religious group affiliation. (3b) These influences will
affect familial-based and equal-opportunity-based dimensions of gender ideology
differentially over time. Furthermore, I hypothesize that (3c) educational attainment and
full-time employment will be more influential toward equal-opportunity-based gender
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ideology, and that being married and having children will be more influential toward
familial-based gender ideology.
Data and Measures
The General Social Survey (GSS) is a nationally representative survey
administered by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and
is partially funded by the National Science Foundation. It was first administered in 1972
and most recently in 2002, with a total of 24 cycles. The GSS is ideal for this study as it
was designed to measure attitudes in America over time. I use items from this survey to
depict respondents’ religious affiliation and attendance, participation in other institutions
(e.g. work and education), and attitudes about gender. To accommodate sample size
restrictions and for ease in comparing religious groups I limit my analysis to Christian
denominations, and I select only eleven GSS cycles between the years of 1977 and 1998
because of item availability.
Many studies examining religious correlations with social attitudes utilize Smith’s
(1990) classification of Protestant denominations into a Fundamentalist-Liberal scale
(Smith 1990 p. 239), easily accessible through the General Social Survey’s FUND
variable. These classifications were based on a range of information, including
denominational beliefs and surveys of church members and leaders (Smith 1990). Other
studies structure their denominational categorization after Roof and McKinney’s (1987)
classification, often at use when referring to “mainline” Protestant denominations.
However, a recent effort by Steensland et al. (2000) seeks to improve primarily on the
Smith (1990) categorization. For the data used in this paper, the Steensland et al. (2000)
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classification primarily departs from Smith’s (1990) work by separating nonaffiliated
respondents from the “liberal” category and Catholic affiliates from the “moderate”
category, including a separate category for black Protestant denominations, and replacing
“fundamentalist” with “evangelical.” Following recent research (e.g. Bolzendahl and
Brooks 2005; Wilcox, Chaves and Franz 2004) I use the Steensland et al. (2000)
classification for the evangelical, mainline, and black Protestant groups, the Catholic
group, and those reporting no affiliation.1 I use a dummy variable comparing
respondents who affiliate with any religious denomination to those who report no
affiliation for analysis at the institutional level, religious group dummy variables at the
organizational and individual levels, and a seven-point scale to measure religious service
attendance (a higher number indicates more frequent attendance) at all levels.
Variables that are frequently only controlled for in similar research have a theoretical
importance here as indicators of individual participation in institutions other than
religion. Educational attainment is measured by comparing respondents with college
experience to those without, and full-time employment is determined by whether the
respondent is employed full time. Being married is determined by whether the
respondent is married, and having children is determined by whether the respondent has
children. I also control for race, southern residence, rural residence, and birth cohort.2
Time is measured by the actual year, and is centered (using a z-score transformation) to

1

I do, however, combine the “Other Methodist” respondents left out of the Steensland et al. (2000)
classification with the “Methodist-Don’t Know Which” respondents they place in the “mainline Protestant”
category.
2
Following Brooks and Bolzendahl (2004) I use dummy variables to represent ten-year birth cohorts, using
the earliest cohort as the reference category.
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decrease collinearity when computing interaction terms. Descriptive statistics of these
variables are listed in Table 1.3
Table 1 about here
The GSS contains several items designed to determine respondents’ attitudes
about gender. Item availability varies by GSS cycle, but eight items were asked
consistently in each of the eleven cycles from 1977 to 1998. Items offer either four
Likert-type response categories or two response options (agree or disagree), in addition to
a “don’t know” response option. These items were used together recently (see Brooks
and Bolzendahl 2004), but as only one scale. As mentioned, it is clear that these items
address different dimensions of gender, and a factor analysis (using Varimax rotation) of
the eight questions yields two distinct dimensions. Items in the first factor address
gender in relation to the home and family, and items in the second factor address gender
in the workplace or public sphere. These seven items 4 are listed in Table 2 with their
eigenvalues.
Table 2 about here
To form the dependent variables, these items were first recoded so that a higher
number indicates a more traditional response. Half of the questions had four answer
options (i.e. Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree); these questions
were collapsed so that each question has an egalitarian and a traditional response
(Strongly Agree and Agree versus Disagree and Strongly Disagree). Rather than taking
an average of the items in each group, the items were added to obtain a count of
3

Blacks are oversampled in the GSS.
One of the eight items, referencing whether women should earn money when a husband is capable of
providing for her, loaded onto its own factor and is excluded from the analysis.

4
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inegalitarian responses. Missing values were deleted from the analysis. Histograms
illustrating the distribution of these counts are displayed in Figure 1. For both variables
the largest response category is that of zero traditional responses, but attitudes appear to
be more egalitarian when considering equal-opportunity-based gender ideology.
Figure 1 about here
Methods
By creating a count variable it is possible to measure changes in the number of
traditional responses rather than changes in a mean score. Utilizing a logistic regression
procedure which compares the possible number of traditional responses (trials) with the
actual number of traditional responses (events) produces odds ratios indicating the odds
of a respondent reporting a traditional response as predicted by the model. I use the SAS
“proc logistic” procedure with the “events/trials” option for these models, and report the
odds ratios for each model. In that I am interested in change over time, I am primarily
concerned with the directionality of the odds ratios.
For the institutional level I include in the model the control variables (race,
southern residence, rural residence, and cohort effects), year, the attendance scale, and
the affiliation variable. I replace the affiliation variable with religious group variables for
evangelical Protestant, black Protestant, mainline Protestant, and Catholic affiliation (“no
affiliation” is the reference category) for the organizational level, and include variables
indicating participation in other institutions (educational attainment, full-time
employment, being married, and having children) in the models for the individual level.
Model fit is determined by the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; a smaller value
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indicates a better fit) and the Max-rescaled R-Square (a generalized R2 that is adjusted
for a binary outcome). I test for interaction effects between year and each independent
variable, retaining the interaction variables for each level if the interaction effect is
significant and if the AIC and Max-Rescaled R2 indicate a better model fit. Retained
interaction variables represent a changing relationship over time.
Results
It should be noted that in 1977, the first year for which I have data, respondents
were already egalitarian in their gender ideologies. Figures 2 and 3 present the
percentage of respondents who report no traditional responses and those who report all
traditional responses by year, for both the familial-based and equal-opportunity-based
dimensions of gender ideology. Except for 1977, only between about 15 and 25 percent
of respondents neglect to give an egalitarian response to familial-based gender ideology
items, and this percentage is declining over time. Between about 35 and 45 percent of
respondents report only egalitarian responses to these items, also becoming more
egalitarian over time.
Figures 2 and 3 about here
A similar pattern is found with reference to equal-opportunity-based gender
ideology, except that respondents are largely more egalitarian when responding to these
items. The percentage of respondents neglecting to give an egalitarian response to these
items is generally less than ten percent, and for most of the years for which I have data
over 50 percent of respondents give only egalitarian responses. Interestingly, based on
these figures alone it appears that there is more change over time among respondents who
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give no traditional responses to items referencing equal-opportunity-based gender
ideology – about a 40-percent compared to an almost 30-percent increase for familialbased gender ideology.
Table 3 about here
Table 3 lists the models tested and fit statistics for each theoretical level
(institutional, organizational, and individual) and for each dependent variable. As
mentioned, for each dependent variable I gradually add level-relevant variables (e.g.
religious group variables for the organizational level) and by-year interaction terms when
independent variables are significant. The preferred model for each level is qualified by
significant interaction terms and an improved fit, and is displayed in bold in Table 3.
Institutional Level
My first hypothesis (1a) at the institutional level concerns change over time.
When predicting familial-based gender ideology, the preferred model does not include
any interaction terms; the effect of religious attendance and affiliation on familial-based
gender ideology is not changing over time. However, for equal-opportunity-based gender
ideology, the preferred model includes the attendance and affiliation interaction terms,
indicating that their effects on attitudes about gender in the workplace are changing over
time.
Tables 4 through 6 display odds ratios, standard errors, and significance levels.
Odds ratios greater than 1.0 indicate less egalitarian attitudes; odds ratios less than 1.0
indicate more egalitarian attitudes. As reported in Table 4, for familial-based gender
ideology the odds ratio for religious attendance is 1.062. The odds ratio for religious

18

affiliation is 1.290. Thus, although respondents are becoming more egalitarian over time
in their familial-based gender ideology, religious attenders and affiliates are consistently
less egalitarian than their non-attending, non-affiliating counterparts.
For equal-opportunity-based gender ideology, the odds ratio for religious
attendance is 1.064, and the odds ratio for religious affiliation is 1.320. As with familialbased gender ideology, religious attenders and affiliates are less egalitarian than those
who do not attend or affiliate. However, the significant interaction terms indicate that
this effect is changing; over time, frequent attendance is associated with less egalitarian
equal-opportunity-based gender ideology (odds ratio 1.013), and religious affiliation is
associated with more egalitarian equal-opportunity-based gender ideology (odds ratio
0.869).
Table 4 about here
These results partially support my first hypothesis (1a); the effect of religious
affiliation and religious over gender at the institutional level is changing over time, but
only for one dimension of gender ideology as measured here. Furthermore, when there is
a changing effect of religious influence, only religious affiliation is associated with more
egalitarian gender ideology; religious attendance is associated with less egalitarian equalopportunity-based gender ideology. Thus, consistent with my second hypothesis (1b),
there is a differential influence of religion over gender ideology; the influence of
religious affiliation has changed for equal-opportunity-based gender ideology but not for
familial-based gender ideology.
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Organizational Level
My third hypothesis (2a) also concerns change over time, but at the organizational
or denominational level. Table 3 indicates that the preferred models for both familialbased gender ideology and equal-opportunity-based gender ideology do include religious
group interaction terms, illustrating that the influence of religious group affiliation (as
opposed to simply religious affiliation) is changing over time.
Table 5 about here
For familial-based gender ideology, only evangelical Protestant, black Protestant,
and Catholic affiliates are statistically different from respondents with no affiliation (with
more traditional attitudes), and the effect of evangelical and black Protestant affiliation
remains constant over time (see Table 5). The interaction terms for mainline Protestant
and Catholic affiliation are slightly outside the 0.05 alpha level (though in the model for
the individual level the mainline Protestant interaction term becomes significant within
the 0.05 alpha level), but the directionality of the odds ratios implies that these groups are
over time becoming more egalitarian.
Figure 4 about here
Figure 4 illustrates mean predicted probabilities for the familial-based gender
ideology counts based on the logistic regression model. As indicated by the odds ratios,
all groups are becoming more egalitarian over time. Mainline Protestant and Catholic
adherents appear to be converging slightly with the nonaffiliated (consistent with their
interaction terms), but the effect of evangelical Protestant affiliation appears to remain
constant over time as indicated by a slope parallel to that of the nonaffiliates.
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In the equal-opportunity-based gender ideology model, each group except
mainline Protestant is statistically different from the nonaffiliates, and every interaction
term is significant. Though the odds ratios for these groups place them in a more
traditional position when compared to respondents with no religious affiliation, the
interaction terms show that each group is following the overall egalitarian trend by
becoming more egalitarian in their attitudes.
Interestingly, as illustrated by the mean predicted probabilities in Figure 5, there
appears to be more convergence among religious groups than for familial-based gender
ideology. The 1977 data indicate a clustering of religious groups apart from, or less
egalitarian than, the nonaffiliates. By 1998, the religious groups are still more traditional
than the nonaffiliates, but less so. For equal-opportunity-based gender ideology, religious
group affiliation offers decreasing resistance against the egalitarian trend.
Figure 5 about here
. Thus, my third hypothesis (2a) that there is a change over time in the effect of
religious group affiliation on gender ideology is, again, only partially true; this change is
present only when considering equal-opportunity-based gender ideology. The
stratification of religious groups in relation to gender ideology supports my hypothesis
(2b) that mainline Protestant groups are more egalitarian than evangelical Protestant
groups in their attitudes. The consistent effects of religious group affiliation for familialbased gender ideology and the changing effects of religious group affiliation for equalopportunity-based gender ideology confirms the hypothesis (2c) of a differential change
in the effect of religious group affiliation among different dimensions of gender.
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Individual Level
Table 6 about here
At the individual level for familial-based gender ideology, as displayed in Table 6
the variables representing participation in other institutions are each highly significant.
The point of interest for my sixth hypothesis (3a), though, is a comparison of the odds
ratios. The odds ratio furthest from zero among the religious groups is that of evangelical
Protestant affiliation (1.534), with educational participation (college attendance) being
the next furthest from zero (0.717). Evangelical Protestant affiliation appears to have a
greater effect than any other variable in the model for familial-based gender ideology,
and the nonsignificant interaction term indicates that this effect is remaining constant
over time. However, for affiliates of other religious groups, college and workforce
participation have a greater effect than affiliation on familial-based gender ideology.
Significant odds ratios for the number of children and marital status affirm that familial
participation has a constant effect on familial-based gender ideology. Thus, my sixth
hypothesis (3a) is partially supported; individual participation in institutions other than
religion affects gender ideology to a greater extent than does participation in the religious
institution, except for evangelical Protestant affiliates.
Marital status does not appear to be a significant predictor of equal-opportunitybased gender ideology at the individual level, but having children restrains the overall
egalitarian trend. Workforce participation is associated with more egalitarian gender
ideology, but the nonsignificant interaction term implies that this influence is remaining
steady over time. Consistent with the findings for familial-based gender ideology,
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college participation is associated with an egalitarian effect toward equal-opportunitybased gender ideology that is becoming less so over time.
Again evangelical Protestant affiliation has the greatest effect toward gender
ideology with an odds ratio of 1.640. The next odds ratio furthest from zero is again for
college participation (0.541), which is also the greatest influence toward equalopportunity-based gender ideology for religious groups other than evangelical Protestant.
My sixth (3a) hypothesis is again only partially supported, as individual participation in
institutions other than religion affects gender ideology to a greater extent than does
participation in the religious institution for religious groups other than evangelical
Protestant. The differential effect of individual participation in secular institutions on
familial-based and equal-opportunity-based gender ideology confirms my seventh
hypothesis (3b). The significance of marital status and the larger odds ratio for number
of children (1.030 compared to 1.016) in the familial-based gender ideology model
confirms my final hypothesis (3c); participation in the familial institution does affect
familial-based gender ideology more than it does equal-opportunity-based gender
ideology.
Discussion
Is secularization as a decline in religious authority over gender occurring? Is
there a “varying scope of religious authority across time and space” (Chaves 1994 pp.
764-765) with respect to gender? These data and previous literature show that gender
ideology, regardless of which controls are included, is becoming more egalitarian over
time. But is religion able to exercise enough authority to slow this process?

23

Religious authority is consistently an important factor in determining both
familial-based and equal-opportunity-based gender ideology at the institutional,
organizational, and individual levels. At the institutional level, religious authority
remains constant over time for familial-based gender ideology. For equal-opportunitybased gender ideology, the changing effects of attendance and affiliation over time
indicate that, although its influence may be changing, religion still exercises authority at
the institutional level. Interestingly, religious attenders are associated with less
egalitarian equal-opportunity-based gender ideology over time, but religious affiliates are
associated with more egalitarian equal-opportunity-based gender ideology over time. This
indicates that it is not so much whether an individual affiliates with a religious group as it
is whether the individual attends religious services that moderates the effect of an overall
egalitarian trend.
At the organizational level, and especially for evangelical Protestant affiliates,
religion acts to moderate the effects of the overall egalitarian trend. However, mainline
Protestant groups are generally similar to religious nonaffiliates in their gender ideology,
and even evangelical Protestants are adopting more egalitarian gender ideology over
time. And, while divergent religious group trends for familial-based gender ideology are
persisting over time, with regards to equal-opportunity-based gender ideology religious
groups are becoming more similar over time.
At the individual level, for most respondents participation in institutions other
than religion exerts more influence over both familial-based gender ideology and equalopportunity-based gender ideology, with familial participation being slightly more
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influential over familial-based gender ideology. However, evangelical Protestants are
uniquely immunized against the influences of participation in other institutions, an effect
that is likely due to the distinct characteristics of conservative and evangelical Protestants
mentioned previously here and in existing literature.
If a trend toward more egalitarian gender ideology is secular, is resisting such a
trend religious authority? Is maintaining religious authority over individual behavior
even when faced with the influences of participation in secular institutions an indication
of the resistance of secularization? These analyses show that religion still has authority
over many aspects of gender ideology in that it can act as a mediating influence against
secular trends. However, these analyses cannot answer the question of whether a decline
in religious authority over gender is actually occurring.
As an example of this dilemma is the previously mentioned decision of the United
Church of Christ to allow homosexual marriage. Is this an instance of a religious
organization converging “with the secular world” (Chaves 1994, p. 757), or is it an
instance of a religious organization adopting a more “accurate” interpretation of the
bible? If the religious influence toward gender ideology inspires more egalitarian views,
even so much that gender ideology of religious adherents cannot be statistically
differentiated from those with no religious affiliation, is this a decline in religious
authority?
Using an example of the Reformed church in the Netherlands, Dekker explains,
“We have to conclude that adaptation or accommodation of the Church is not, by
definition, secularization. It may also result in an actualization or a revitalization of the
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faith of people; an updating of the religiosity of people, which enables them to remain
religious or to believe in our modern society” (Dekker 1995, p. 85). Dekker recognizes
that secularization may occur as “the restriction of the range of influence of religion” (p.
86), or a decline in religious authority, but maintains that accommodation is not
secularization.
While Chaves’ definition of secularization as a decline in religious authority may
be valid, it is difficult to test. Whether these analyses support this view of secularization
necessarily depends on whether one views convergence with secular trends a decline in
religious authority. I conclude that religion still has authority over many aspects of
gender ideology in that it can act as a mediating influence against secular trends, and that
a decline in religious authority is not evident according to these data.
What is evident is that there is a changing relationship between religion and
gender over time. Also evident is that gender ideology is affected by an interinstitutional
system, with individuals negotiating among a complex myriad of ideological demands.
But there is hope for fans of religion – evangelical Protestants, at least, seem to be
maintaining distinctiveness despite other institutional pressures.
There are many other questions that this research cannot answer. Existing
literature identifies differing religious practices and religious effects among men and
women. While sex was controlled for in this paper, an examination of variation within
sex categories would yield even more information about the changing relationship
between religion and gender. Additionally, existing research has found a significant
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amount of variation within conservative or evangelical Protestant groups. Future
research should use the approach found in this paper to further analyze those groups.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Control Variables
Mean/
Variable
How Measured
%
Year
Z score of GSS cycle year
-Cohort

Ten-year intervals of birth year

Rural residence

SD
--

--

--

1 = rural residence

13.5%

0.342

Sex

1 = female, 0 = male

58.5%

0.493

Race

1 = black, 0 = else

12.8%

0.334

Rural residence

1 = rural residence, 0 = else

13.5%

0.342

Southern residence

1 = Southern residence, 0 = else

35.6%

0.479

Religious service
attendance

Seven-point scale; 0 = never, 7 = every week
or more

3.821

2.597

Denominational
affiliation

1 = Any affiliation, 0 = no affiliation

89.9%

0.301

Evangelical
Protestant affiliation

1 = Evangelical Protestant, 0 = else

28.5%

0.452

Black Protestant
affiliation

1 = Black Protestant, 0 = else

9.1%

0.288

Mainline Protestant
affiliation

1 = Mainline Protestant, 0 = else

23.9%

0.426

Catholic affiliation

1 = Catholic, 0 = else

28.4%

0.451

No affiliation

1 = No affiliation, 0 = else

10.1%

0.301

Education

1 = Some college or more, 0 = else

12.78

3.033

Marital status

1 = Married, 0 = else

54.0%

0.498

Number of children

Number of children

1.93

1.769

Workforce
participation

1 = Working full-time, 0 = else

52.4%

0.499
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Table 2. Items and Count Variables for Familial-Based and Equal-OpportunityBased Gender Ideology
Factor Scores

Question Wording

Familial
Women should take care of running their homes and
leave running the country up to men.
If your party nominated a woman for President, would
you vote for her if she were qualified for the job?
Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than
are most women.
It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s
career than to have one herself.
It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the
achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of
the home and family.
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a
relationship with her children as a mother who does not
work.
A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother
works.
Eigenvalues
Percent of Variance
Cronbach’s Alpha of Items
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EO
0.788
0.709
0.772
0.580

0.630

0.797

0.839
1.098
15.687
0.715

3.179
43.421
0.732

Table 3. Model Descriptions and Fit Statistics
Fit Statistics
AIC
R2 a

Model Descriptions
Familial-based gender ideology
Institutional level
1. Controlsb + attendance + affiliation
2. Model 1 + attendance*year
3. Model 1 + affiliation*year
4. Model 1 + attendance*year + affiliation*year
Organizational level
5. Controls + attendance + religious groups
6. Model 5 + religious groups*year
Individual level
7. Model 6 + nonreligious sphere participation
8. Model 7 + educational attainment*year
9. Model 7 + number of children*year
10. Model 7 + marital status*year
11. Model 7 + full-time employment*year

42437.129
42438.219
42438.527
42438.790

0.159
0.159
0.159
0.159

42282.065
42263.091

0.164
0.165

41935.487
41911.359
41937.281
41935.876
41936.739

0.176
0.177
0.176
0.177
0.177

Equal-opportunity-based gender ideology
Institutional level
1. Controls + attendance + affiliation
43776.006
0.170
2. Model 1 + attendance*year
43774.535
0.170
3. Model 1 + affiliation*year
43773.892
0.170
4. Model 1 + attendance*year + affiliation*year
43768.754
0.170
Organizational level
5. Model 2 + religious groups
43457.989
0.180
6. Model 5 + religious groups*year
43452.750
0.180
Individual level
7. Model 6 + nonreligious sphere participation
42952.177
0.195
8. Model 6 + educational attainment*year
42943.608
0.195
9. Model 6 + number of children*year
42952.299
0.195
10. Model 6 + full-time employment*year
42953.793
0.195
Bolded model indicates preferred model
a
Max-Rescaled R2
b
Controls include year, race, rural residence, southern residence, and birth cohort
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Odds Ratios for Gender Ideology,
Institutional Level
Gender Ideology
Independent Variables
Familial
EO
Year
0.867***
0.806***
(0.012)
(0.047)
Attendance

1.062***
(0.005)

Attendance*Year

--

Affiliation

1.290***
(0.045)

Affiliation*Year

--

1.064***
(0.005)
1.013*
(0.005)
1.320***
(0.005)
0.869*
(0.005)

All models include control variables.
Interaction terms are not reported if they are not significant in the model.
†
p < 0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.005 ***p < 0.001
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Odds Ratios for Gender Ideology,
Organizational Level
Gender Ideology
Independent Variables
Familial
EO
Year
0.982*
0.810***
(0.007)
(0.047)
Attendance

1.055***
(0.005)

Attendance*Year

--

Evangelical Protestant affiliation
Evangelical Protestant*Year
Black Protestant affiliation
Black Protestant*Year
Mainline Protestant affiliation
Mainline Protestant*Year
Catholic affiliation
Catholic*Year

1.055***
(0.005)
1.012*
(0.005)

1.639***
(0.049)

1.806***
(0.056)

1.053
(0.046)

0.884*
(0.005)

1.237*
(0.078)

1.391***
(0.082)

0.956
(0.056)

0.880*
(0.062)

1.085
(0.050)

1.006
(0.058)

0.917†
(0.047)

0.859**
(0.054)

1.271***
(0.049)

1.241***
(0.057)

0.913†
(0.046)

0.831***
(0.054)

All models include control variables.
Interaction terms are not reported if they are not significant in the model.
†
p < 0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.005 ***p < 0.001

37

Table 6. Logistic Regression Odds Ratios for Gender Ideology,
Individual Level
Gender Ideology
Independent Variables
Familial
EO
Year
0.873**
0.808***
(0.042)
(0.047)
Attendance
Attendance*Year
Evangelical Protestant affiliation

1.062***
(0.005)
--

1.069***
(0.005)
1.011*
(0.005)

1.534***
(0.050)

1.640***
(0.056)

1.064
(0.047)

0.886*
(0.054)

1.150
(0.079)

1.253*
(0.082)

0.968
(0.057)

0.882*
(0.062)

1.087
(0.050)

1.009
(0.058)

0.901*
(0.047)

0.844**
(0.054)

1.214***
(0.050)

1.162*
(0.057)

0.915†
(0.047)

0.837**
(0.055)

0.717***
(0.030)

0.541***
(0.034)

1.163***
(0.030)

1.112**
(0.033)

Marital status (married vs. all else)

1.112***
(0.025)

1.021
(0.026)

Full-time employment (full-time vs. all else)

0.737***
(0.027)

0.776***
(0.028)

Number of children

1.030***
(0.008)

1.016*
(0.007)

Evangelical Protestant*Year
Black Protestant affiliation
Black Protestant*Year
Mainline Protestant affiliation
Mainline Protestant*Year
Catholic affiliation
Catholic*Year
Educational attainment
College*Year

All models include control variables.
Interaction terms are not reported if they are not significant in the model.
†
p < 0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.005 ***p < 0.001
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Figure 1. Histograms of Dependent Variables
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Figure 2. Percent of Respondents in Count Categories for
Familial-Based Gender Ideology
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Figure 3. Percent of Respondents in Count Categories for
Equal-Opportunity-Based Gender Ideology
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Figure 4. Mean Predicted Probabilities for Familial-Based Gender Ideology
Counts
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Note: Only Mainline Protestant and Catholic groups are statistically distinct from nonaffiliates
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Figure 5. Mean Predicted Probabilities for Equal-Opportunity-Based
Gender Ideology Counts
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Note: All religious groups are statistically distinct from nonaffiliates
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